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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of firms and government agencies in the U.S. adopting programs to combat substance abuse in the workplace has increased steadily over time. The percentage of medium-to large-sized U.S. firms using some form of drug testing nearly doubled in the 1990's following passage of the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, which requires companies with federal contracts to make appropriate efforts to maintain a drugfree workplace (Hartwell et al. 1996) . 1 The types of testing programs vary considerably:
some organizations require tests of job applicants, others impose 'probable cause' tests, and still others, especially those in the utility and transportation sectors, require periodic or random testing of all employees. 2 A small number of employers, most notably the military, have implemented a zero tolerance policy that combines aggressive drug testing with dismissal or prosecution of drug-positive workers. Despite the widespread use of drug testing and other workplace interventions, and the legal controversies surrounding them (Lieberwitz, 1994) , there is scant research on the effects of these programs or their efficiency.
This paper explores the economic costs and benefits of a particularly aggressive workplace drug prevention program that has existed in the U.S. military since 1981 (Bray et al. 1992) . The military mandates regular random drug testing of current service members and imposes severe penalties on those who test positive for drugs. Penalties range from dismissal, which may bar the individual from future government employment and from collecting veterans' benefits, to court martial, which carries jail time or fines.
Despite the popularity of the zero tolerance concept, the welfare gains or losses of such programs have not been evaluated in the literature. The military's drug policies offer a unique natural experiment for studying a zero tolerance policy.
The goal of a punitive policy such as zero tolerance is to increase the probability of detection of current drug users and to impose sanctions to deter potential drug users.
Economic benefits of the program depend on the size of the deterrence and detection effects. To assess the size of the deterrence effect empirically we estimate annual differences in illicit drug use between military and civilian workers based on data from the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) and the U.S. Defense
Department's Worldwide Health Survey. To assess the detection effect we obtain data on the actual number of users detected in the Navy for a given year. We use estimates of work time lost due to drug use to monetize the benefits associated with deterrence and detection. Because of the assumptions necessary to calculate program benefits and costs,
we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the robustness of annual net benefit estimates.
Although the analysis relies on data from the Navy's program, the results should be representative of effects across the military.
This paper is structured in the following way. Section II describes the statistical methodology for estimating the deterrence effect while Section III monetizes the benefits of detecting and deterring drug users. Section IV describes the costs of the zero tolerance policy and Section V analyzes the sensitivity of annual costs and benefits to alternate assumptions. Section VI concludes that, for plausible values of the key parameters, annual net benefits of the zero tolerance/testing policy are negative. (Bray et al., 1992) .
II. ESTIMATES OF THE DETERRENCE EFFECT
In addition, a number of standard demographic measures are available in both surveys. A binary indicator of each respondent's drug participation is based on positive responses to questions on the non-medical use of one or more of 11 illegal substances in the past 12 months.
One method of analyzing the impact of the policy change on drug use is the difference-in-difference framework. This approach involves comparing the change in behavior in the military sector, where the zero tolerance 'treatment' was implemented, with the change in behavior in the civilian sector, where drug testing is less extensive or absent and where zero tolerance policies are rare. The greater certainty and severity of punishment in the military should increase the cost of using drugs to service members and reduce drug prevalence rates in the military relative to the civilian workforce. Table 1 presents the means of the variables in the data set divided into the military and civilian sectors, before and after the policy change. As the first two rows show, the policy change was associated with a significant decrease in military drug use. Although drug use also declined in the civilian sector, it fell much faster in the military: past month use fell by 90% in the military but by only 60% in the civilian sector; similarly, past-year use fell by 84% in the military but by only 54% in the civilian sector.
Difference-in-difference estimates are derived from a linear probability model of the following form:
where DRUG i is a dummy for drug use by person i, MIL is an indicator for a military service member, YEAR95 is an indicator of whether the year is after the policy change, and X i is a set of covariates for person i (age, marital status, education, gender, race/ethnicity). In this framework, the coefficient of β 3 measures the effect of being in the military, relative to being in the civilian sector, after the zero tolerance policy, relative to before. That is, the coefficient of the military-year interaction measures the change in drug behavior of personnel who work under a zero tolerance policy versus the change for civilians who are not subject to equally punitive policies. The results are presented in Table 2 .
The results for the control variables in Table 2 The data used here are based on self-reported surveys, which are known to understate actual drug use (Bray et al. 1992; Harrison and Hughes, 1997 This conclusion, however, is marred by some inconsistencies in their method. For users who tested positive but who did not self-report, they accept the results of the urinalysis; on the other hand, for those who tested negative on the urinalysis, they accept the individual's self-report in lieu of the urinalysis result. Second, the authors compare individuals tested via urinalysis with those tested via hair analysis, which are not comparable testing methods. When these inconsistencies are eliminated, the true prevalence rate in their data is 11.3%, suggesting underreporting of about 20%.
Because the authors examine various interview techniques to obtain the selfreported rates, and two types of laboratory tests, it is difficult to accept their conclusion that the true rate is 14.2% (compared to the self-reported rate of 9.4%). Moreover, the underreporting they observe is likely to exist in both the DHS and the NHSDA and, therefore, their evidence cannot be considered conclusive on the relative measurement error in the two surveys. Harrison (1997, p. 30) surveys validation studies and concludes that "at this point, it is not possible to judge how validly individuals report their drug use in surveys." Despite the lack of evidence on underreporting in the two drug surveys, to allow for the possibility of differences in self-reporting in the DHS, we estimate the deterrence effects with and without an adjustment for underreporting. We account for underreporting by reducing the difference-in-difference program effect by 20%, the lower figure from the Cook, Bernstein, and Andrews (1997) study, which yields an adjusted deterrence effect of 7.88 points. This adjustment creates a lower-bound estimate of the deterrence effect.
The approach above uses the entire civilian workforce as the comparison group.
One problem with this approach is that some civilian NHSDA respondents work in industries that routinely apply drug testing. Unfortunately, we have little specific information on the type or extent of drug testing policies by broad industry category. It is known, however, that drug testing is more widespread in the transportation industry therefore we experimented by omitting respondents in the transportation industry from the civilian sample. This alteration had very little effect on the basic difference-indifference estimates.
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III. BENEFITS OF ZERO TOLERANCE
The benefits of a workplace drug prevention program hinge on the gain in worker productivity when the program successfully reduces drug abuse. Monetizing benefits first requires estimates of worker productivity losses due to drug use. Prior studies that have analyzed productivity differences between drug-using and drug-free employees have produced conflicting results. Some studies have discovered a link between drug use and degraded performance, which has been attributed to greater absenteeism, reduced job performance, higher accident and injury rates, greater use of medical benefits, and lower job retention (Zwerling, et al., 1992; Martin, et al., 1994) . However, the methodologies and conclusions of many of these studies have been challenged (Horgan, 1990) , and the National Academy of Sciences could find no clear evidence that drug use reduces safety or other job performance indicators (Normand, 1994, p. 107) .
To estimate productivity losses in the military associated with drug consumption we assess the responses to questions in the DHS on the negative job consequences of drug or alcohol use. 7 An index of work days lost due to drug use was constructed based on five questions in the DHS. The questions record the number of times the respondent was late to work, left work early, was hurt in an accident, was absent from work, or performed below normal due to drug use. Each response was weighted by the number of days, or portion of a day, assumed to be lost for each reported incident and summed to create the annual number of days lost per drug-using worker. 8 For the sample, the average number of days lost annually due to drug use was 9.15 (or 3.7% of annual work days) per drug-using worker.
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Because of considerable evidence in the literature of comorbidity between drugs and alcohol (Martin et al. 1994 ) the measure of days lost due solely to drug use may understate the true amount of lost output. To allow for comorbidity we create a second estimate of output loss by adding work days lost due to alcohol use to the previous index (using the same weighting scheme). The average combined number of days lost due to both alcohol and drugs per drug-using worker was 23.12 (or 9.2% of annual work days). 10 These two 'productivity degradation' factors -3.7% and 9.2% --establish the range used below to perform partial sensitivity analyses of the impact of productivity losses on net benefits.
A range of degradation estimates is needed due to the inherent uncertainty of the true performance loss in the military. As pointed out above, numerous studies have found no evidence of damages due to workplace drug use in civilian firms. On the other hand, the Navy is not comparable to private firms. One difference is that safety is an important issue in the daily operation of ships, aircraft, and submarines and the associated weapons and nuclear power systems. Military personnel also handle classified material.
Furthermore, due to the importance of team production in the military, absenteeism and degraded performance will affect overall unit performance and readiness. These full effects are difficult to evaluate but are assumed to be bracketed by the range of losses established by the two productivity degradation indexes.
A. Monetary Benefits of Detecting Drug Users.
To derive indicators of the costs avoided by deterring and detecting drug users, In 1999 there were 314,272 Navy enlisted personnel, of whom 5,416 (1.7%) were detected and terminated for failing the urinalysis test. This number represents gross detections, but we must use net detections by adjusting for the number of replacements who themselves will be drug users. We assume that the prevalence rate among new recruits is four percent, about one point lower than the overall Navy prevalence rate of five percent. This yields 5,199 net detected members. Annual benefits to the Navy of detecting and terminating 5,199 drug users in 1999 range from $4.37 million under the low degradation factor to $10.87 million under the high degradation factor.
B. Monetary Benefits of Deterring Potential Drug Users.
Since 5% of Navy personnel used drugs in 1995, the estimated deterrence effect of Table 3 summarizes gross benefits to the Navy, which range from $25.21 million under the low degradation/low deterrence combination (column 4), to $75.71 million under the high deterrence/high degradation combination (col. 2). It is noteworthy that the benefits associated with deterrence far outweigh the benefits generated by detecting current users.
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IV. THE COST OF DRUG TESTING AND ZERO TOLERANCE
The primary cost component of a zero tolerance policy is the cost of replacing individuals dismissed for failing a urinalysis test. The primary approach for estimating the replacement cost of those dismissed for being drug-positive in 1999 is to assume that replacements are acquired via lateral entry much as they are in private firms. That is, a Table 3 indicates that net losses are robust to variations in the key parameters. Another way to view these results is to calculate the required level of a given parameter for the program to breakeven. Breakeven degradation factors are .11
(assuming high deterrence) and .15 (assuming low deterrence).
V. CONCLUSIONS
Computing the welfare gains of a zero tolerance policy in a comprehensive manner requires numerous assumptions. While these calculations have inherent limitations, we find that for reasonable parameter values there are welfare losses from a zero tolerance policy. If a program yields substantial net benefits using worst case assumptions, the program can be recommended even in the face of considerable uncertainty about the exact magnitude of the benefits. In this case, however, the military's drug program generates positive net benefits only when key parameters are implausibly high. Even a productivity degradation factor of .11 exceeds our upper-bound estimate of .092, which itself is likely to overstate the true productivity losses associated with drug use in the Navy. The fact that private firms are able to adjust wages to reflect the damages imposed by drug abusers, but that prior studies of private sector wages have not detected a consistent pattern of reduced wages for drug users suggests that damages imposed by drug use in the workplace may be closer to, or below, our lower-bound degradation factor (.037).
The negative net benefits in this study suggest that the considerable resources devoted to drug prevention in the military could be reallocated to other prevention efforts such as counseling, rehabilitation, or education. 15 Prior to 1981 the Navy referred drug abusers to rehabilitation and the available evidence suggests that treatment programs were cost-effective. 16 Indeed, rehabilitation normally will be more cost-effective than a zero tolerance policy because a major portion of the benefits of rehabilitation are avoided replacement costs. Decision makers also may maximize net benefits by selecting a combination of policies, which might include a 'two-or three-strikes' option along with rehabilitation.
Even though the drug prevention program yields net economic losses, decision makers may be willing to accept them if other, non-quantifiable benefits are sizeable or highly valued. For example, analysts have pointed out that in organizations such as the military and law enforcement, drug testing enhances the public's trust and support for the organization (Felman and Petrini 1988) . Greater public support can enhance the organization's effectiveness and its ability to successfully achieve its goals. Secondly, the military is a highly visible organization that may serve as a role model for youth, which may generate external social benefits from its drug policy.
There are, on the other hand, non-quantifiable costs of zero tolerance that also must be weighed and that are not internalized by military decision makers. For example, drug screening will likely reduce the number of qualified military applicants who are non-users, as well as those who are users, because potential applicants may wish to avoid the invasion of privacy and mis-trust implied by random drug testing. Also, there may be a loss of reputation and future civilian employability of individuals simply because they failed a urinalysis test.
Furthermore, Cowan (1987) claims that the recovery rate in employer-sponsored treatment programs is between 60% and 90% for alcohol and drug abusers if the worker remains employed, but is only 5% if the individual becomes unemployed. This suggests that a zero tolerance policy that fires a drug-positive worker not only creates an unemployed worker who may receive unemployment insurance and who may be less employable, but also by not referring the worker to treatment may prolong the worker's drug or alcohol problem thus imposing secondary social costs.
This study represents a first effort to estimate the economic value of workplace drug programs. The estimates should be considered provisional as additional research is needed to improve the estimates of the key parameters that are so crucial to total program benefits. It is hoped that our paper narrows the range bracketing the true deterrence effect and productivity degradation factors. We argue that the true size of these parameters lie closer to the low end of the range estimated reported here, but it remains for future researchers to identify these effects more precisely and to confirm whether net social costs can be expected in other workplaces. Dependent variable is the probability of drug participation in last year. Regressions also include three age dummies and three education dummies. a Implied probability effect. ).
5 Martinez (1998) surveys the evolution of the four service's drug policies. 6 Note that using the all-industry civilian comparison group may not be a serious flaw. While some civilian workers face drug testing of some type, few face the frequent random testing imposed by the military, and virtually none face a zero tolerance policy (see Macdonald and Wells, 1994) . To the extent that some members of the comparison group are tested the regression estimates will understate the deterrence effect. This is acceptable given that our goal is to create a conservative estimate of the deterrence effect. 7 If firms can shift the costs imposed by drug-using employees, hedonic wage studies would provide useful information on productivity losses from worker drug use. Unfortunately, a large literature that has used this approach has found widely varying results, including a positive relationship between drug use and wages (French, et al., 1998 survey this literature) . Note that if firms can shift the costs of drug use to workers in the form of lower wages, there is little incentive to use drug tests. Drug testing is efficient only if drug abusers impose external costs, productivity is hard to measure, or wages cannot be adjusted for individual productivity differences. Administrative wage setting is one reason drug testing may be efficient in the military. 8 Each incident of tardiness, leaving work early, and performing below normal was weighted by .25 days; each absence was weighted by 1.0; and, an injury was weighted by 5.0 days.
